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Abstract
We study an extension of the DeGroot model
where part of the players may be rebels. The
updating rule for rebels is quite different with
that of normal players (which are referred to
as conformists): at each step a rebel first takes
the opposite value of the weighted average of
her neighbors’ opinions, i.e. 1 minus that av-
erage (the opinion space is assumed to be [0,1]
as usual), and then updates her opinion by taking
another weighted average between that value and
her own opinion in the last round. We find that
the effect of rebels is rather significant: as long
as there is at least one rebel in every closed and
strongly connected group, under very weak con-
ditions, the opinion of each player in the whole
society will eventually tend to 0.5.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, the DeGroot
model, naive learning, opinion dynamics, rebels,
the doctrine of the mean
1 Introduction
Social learning is an old yet still booming re-
search field, attracting more and more atten-
tion from economists, sociologists, physicists,
and even computer scientists and game theo-
rists (Jackson, 2009; Castellano, 2009; Lorenz,
2007). Based on whether players are fully ratio-
nal or bounded rational, this field can be roughly
divided into two branches, Bayesian learning
and non-Bayesian learning (Jackson, 2009; Ace-
mogluy and Ozdaglar, 2010). One common as-
sumption in current research is that there is a
learning topology, which is usually represented
by a network (perhaps weighted and directed),
indicating who learns from whom. One main dif-
ference between the research of Bayesian learn-
ing and that of non-Bayesian learning is that
the learning in the first branch is repeated for
each player, but usually one-shot in the second
branch, because repeated Bayesian learning on
networks is formidably difficult, as shown by
Syngjoo et al. (2008). It’s very hard to say which
of the two learning rules is more realistic, be-
cause the former is so complicated that it is be-
yond the ability of ordinary human being, and
conversely the latter is over simplified that peo-
ple may not be so naive at all in the real world.
However, for academic studies, they can both
serve as very good benchmarks. In this paper,
we shall concentrate on one particular model of
the non-Bayesian learning, the DeGroot model
(DeGroot, 1974).
In almost all learning models studied so far, it
is assumed that people believe that the opinions
(or information, beliefs) that their neighbors (or
friends) hold are not only valuable, but also cor-
rect (to certain degree). To understand the differ-
ence between valuable and correct, just consider
the situation where there is a liar who always lies
about his real opinion by telling the opposite. Al-
though the liar’s opinion may not be correct at
all, it’s still valuable for his neighbors, because
they can interpret this opinion by taking an op-
posite once again. And what’s more, it’s also
usually assumed that the initial opinion that each
person hold is indeed correct to certain degree.
To be more specific, it is usually assumed that the
(perhaps weighted) average opinion of the whole
society (often required to be large enough) is (at
least approximately) true. Consequently, for any
given learning rule, whether people in the soci-
ety can aggregate the scattered opinions into the
ultimately true one, i.e. whether wise consensus
(in various senses) is reachable, is one of the core
problems studied in the field of social learning.
The situation with naive liars can be easily
transformed into classical models as shown by
the above argument, as long as whether a player
is a liar or not is known to all her neighbors.
However, the other situation where there are
players who don’t believe that the opinions of
their neighbors are correct at all, for various rea-
sons, can not be transformed into the classical
models. In this paper, we shall study a spe-
cial case of the above situation where there are
rebels, i.e. players who always take the opposite
opinions to their neighbors’ overall opinions.
We are not going to discuss whether rebels
are rational or not, but their effect on the clas-
sical learning models. First of all, rebels do exist
in the real world. They behave like this either
because of their characters or because they be-
lieve this is fashionable. In fact, the term rebel
comes from Jackson (2009), who formulates a
game model called the fashion game (see also
Cao and Yang, 2011). Another evidence comes
from Krugman (1996), who argues that “some
intellectuals reject comparative advantage sim-
ply out of a desire to be intellectually fashion-
able”, because “in a culture that always prizes
the avant-garde, attacking that icon is seen as a
way to seem daring and unconventional”.
Our research is based directly on the seminal
DeGroot model (DeGroot, 1974), which is still
one of the most basic models studied in non-
Bayesian learning. In the DeGroot model, peo-
ple update their opinions at each step simply by
taking a weighted average of their neighbors’
opinions. And the updatings of all players are
done at each step simultaneously. Historically,
this naive learning rule has long been thought of
as too simple to lead to a wise consensus (So-
bel, 2000). Interestingly, it is shown recently
by Golub and Jackson (2010) that there exists a
fairly broad collection of networks where wise
consensus can be reached.
Our finds are quite surprising, the effect of
rebels is not only remarkable but even domi-
nant. Under very weak conditions, very few
rebels can lead the whole society to the doctrine
of the mean, i.e. all people (not only rebels) hold
eventually an opinion of 0.5 (the opinion space
as usually assumed is [0,1]), and this is regard-
less of initial opinions.
Our model can be taken as a heterogeneous
model, i.e. there are more than one types of
agents, and our study also echoes the question
raised by Golub and Jackson (2010) that “can a
small admixture of different agents significantly
change the group’s behavior?” Our answer is
definitely yes for the situation with rebels.
As stated in the first sentence of this sec-
tion, social learning is a typical multidisciplinary
field. This paper follows the research thread
driven by economists. For more knowledge
about this thread, please refer Jackson (2009),
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010), and Golub and
Jackson (2010). In the thread driven by physi-
cians, it is usually called opinion dynamics and
rarely social learning (in comparison, in that
driven by economists, the terms social learn-
ing and opinion dynamics are interchangeably
used). In the study of opinion dynamics by phys-
ical scientists, the effect of rebels, where Galam
calls them contrarians, has already been stud-
ied (Galam, 2004; Galam, 2008). We note that
there are huge differences between the model of
Galam and that of ours. To be specific, Galam
studies a voter model, i.e. there are only two
possible opinions, 0 and 1, while opinions in our
model are continuous. And the interaction pro-
cess used in his model (mainly random group-
ing at each step), is completely different from
ours. However, very interestingly, the main find-
ing of Galam has a very similar spirit with ours:
he finds that contrarians in the voter game tend
to lead to hung elections (i.e. the election results
are almost 50:50). A very actively studied model
in opinion dynamics is the HK model, please re-
fer Lorenz (2007) for more literature. For more
models of opinion dynamics, please refer Galam
(2008) and Castellano et al. (2009).
The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 gives a formal description of
our model, as well as the necessary preliminar-
ies that will be used in later sections. Section 3
is the main body of this paper, where the theo-
retical results are provided. Section 4 concludes
this paper with several further remarks.
2 Model Description and Preliminaries
We are given a set of players N = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Initially, each player j ∈ N holds an opin-
ion xj(0). As usual, we assume that xj(0) ∈
[0, 1]. The learning topology is represented by a
stochastic matrix A, i.e. each entry of A is non-
negative, and each row of A sums to 1. Ajk is
the weight that player j places on k. The larger
Ajk is, the more important k is in the eyes of j.
To put it another way, Ajk is the extent to which
player j believes that the opinion of k can repre-
sent that of the whole society (herself excluded).
Thus, the value of Ajk is private to j. In the
opinion updating process, player j considers the
opinion of k iff Ajk > 0, in which case we say
that k is a neighbor of j. Notice that the relation-
ship of being neighbors may not be symmetric,
i.e. it may well happen that k is j’s neighbor, but
not the converse.
Each player has a type of either a conformist
or a rebel, which is pre-given and fixed. For all
j ∈ N , let xj(t) be her opinion at time t. Rebels
and conformists distinguish each other by their
different opinion updating rules. The updating
rule of a conformist is exactly the same as in
the DeGroot model. If j is a conformist, then at
time t+ 1 she takes a weighted average over all
the opinions at time t (her own opinion at time t
will also be considered, as long as Ajj > 0), i.e.
xj(t+ 1) =
∑
k∈N Ajkxk(t).
If j is a rebel, then unlike a conformist who
tries to hold an opinion that is as close as pos-
sible to the overall opinion of the whole society,
she tries to be different with others, i.e. she tries
first to detect the overall opinion of the others,
and then take an opposite (1 minus that overall
opinion, because we assume the opinion space
is [0, 1]). The critical issue is how to deal with
the opinion of her own in the last round. We as-
sume that she desires to be consistent with her-
self. It’s kind of absurd for her to treat her own
opinion equally as the other opinions, because
although she likes to hold opposite opinions with
the others, she should not refute herself. Just pic-
ture the extreme case where a rebel j puts very
tiny weights on the others (perhaps because she
does not get along with her neighbors, and thus
is rather unsure about their real opinions), if her
own opinion in the last round is treated the same
as that of her neighbors, then in each round she
will take an almost opposite opinion as to the last
round. This is quite quirky, and very few people,
if any, have this kind of bizarre personality.
To distinguish the different treatment of a
rebel j on her own opinion, we use λj ∈ [0, 1]
to denote her level of confidence, i.e. the weight
she puts on herself. For convenience, we as-
sume that Ajj = 0 and
∑
j∈N Ajk = 1, and
put an overall weight of 1 − λj on the average
opinion of her neighbors. The updating rule of a
rebel j is xj(t + 1) = λjxj(t) + (1 − λj)(1 −∑
k∈N Ajkxj(t)).
To get a uniform updating formula for both
rebels and conformists, for each conformist j we
also use λj to denote her level of confidence and
assume that Ajj = 0. To sum up, we have
xj(t+1) =
{
λjxj(t) + (1 − λj)
∑
k∈N
Ajkxk(t) if uj = 1
λjxj(t) + (1 − λj)
(
1 −
∑
k∈N
Ajkxj(t)
)
if uj = 0
.
(1)
Notice that A is still a stochastic matrix and
recall our assumption that
Ajj = 0,∀j ∈ N. (2)
For technical reasons, we further assume in
this paper that all the confidence levels are iden-
tical, and we use a new symbol λ to denote this
value, i.e.
λj = λ,∀j ∈ N. (3)
In the rest of this section, we shall provide
several necessary concepts and preliminaries.
Associated with each stochastic matrix A is a
digraph G(A): the nodes are naturally N =
{1, 2, · · · , n}, and there is an edge going from j
to k if and only ifAjk > 0. To study the structure
of G(A) is usually more intuitive than to study
A directly, and tools of graph theory can also
be conveniently applied. G(A) is called strongly
connected if and only if for each pair of nodes
(j, k), there is a sequence of directed edges lead-
ing from j to k. It turns out that G(A) is strongly
connected if and only if A is irreducible. We
present this fact formally by the following defi-
nition and lemma.
Definition 1. [Meyer, 2000, p671] An×n is
said to be a reducible matrix when there exists
a permutation matrix P such that P TAP =(
X Y
0 Z
)
, where X and Z are both square.
Otherwise, it is called irreducible.
Lemma 1. [Meyer, 2000, p671] A is an ir-
reducible matrix if and only if G(A) is strongly
connected.
In this paper, we shall use the term strongly
connected and irreducible interchangeably.
Given a stochastic matrix A and the as-
sociated digraph G(A), a sequence of nodes
(j1, j2, · · · , js) is called a cycle if and only if (i)
Ajljl+1 > 0 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ s, where js+1 ≡ 1;
(ii) no node is repeated. We note that this con-
cept is called simple cycle in Golub and Jackson
(2010).
Another important concept is aperiodic,
which describes a digraph that the greatest com-
mon divisor of the lengths of its cycles is 1. It
turns out that for strongly connected graphs, the
concept of aperiodic is equivalent to a basic con-
cept primitive in matrix theory. Following the
notations of Meyer (2000), we shall use ρ(A)
throughout the rest of this paper to denote the
spectrum radius of matrix A, i.e. the largest ab-
solute value of all the eigenvalues of A (which
might be complex). Also, we use σ(A) to denote
the set of all the eigenvalues of A, then
ρ(A) = max{|r| : r ∈ σ(A)}. (4)
The exact definition of primitive is as follows.
Definition 2. [Meyer, 2000, p674] A nonnega-
tive irreducible matrix A having only one eigen-
value, r = ρ(A), on its spectral circle is said to
be a primitive matrix.
Notice that the definition used in Golub and
Jackson (2010) is not the same as the above one.
In fact, their definition is a characterization of
primitive matrices. The following formal equiv-
alence relationship between aperiodic and prim-
itive is first proved by Perkins (1961), and the
form we present is directly from Golub and Jack-
son (2010).
Lemma 2. Assume A is stochastic and the
associated digraph G(A) is strongly connected.
Then G(A) is aperiodic if and only if A is primi-
tive.
To finish this section, we present one more ba-
sic result of matrix theory. Other deeper results
used in the next section will be provided there.
Lemma 3. [Meyer, 2000, p618] For A ∈
Cn×n, where C is the set of complex numbers,
the following statements are equivalent.
(i) The Neumann series I+A+A2+ · · · con-
verges.
(ii) ρ(A) < 1.
(iii) limk→∞Ak = 0.
In which case, (I − A)−1 exists and∑∞
k=0A
k = (I −A)−1.
3 Main Results
We study first the easier case where all players
are rebels, and then the general case with partial
rebels and partial conformists.
3.1 The special case with all rebels
When all players are rebels, the updating
rule can be represented conveniently in vec-
tor and matrix notations. In fact, let
x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t))
T and 1 =
(1, 1, · · · , 1)T , the following updating rule is ob-
vious due to (1) and (3).
x(t+ 1) = λx(t) + (1− λ)(1−Ax(t)). (5)
The first property we study about (5) is con-
vergence, by which we mean that limt→∞ xj(t)
exists for all j ∈ N , regardless of initial values
x(1).
Theorem 1. In the special case of the hetero-
geneous DeGroot model with all rebels, suppose
the learning topology A is stochastic and the as-
sociated digraph G(A) is strongly connected.
(i) When λ = 0, dynamic (5) is divergent.
(ii) When λ 6= 0, if −1 /∈ σ(A), then dy-
namic (5) converges to 121, regardless of the ini-
tial opinions x(1).
Proof. Dynamic (5) can be rewritten as
x(t+ 1) = (λI − (1− λ)A)x(t) + (1− λ)1.
Let B = λI − (1− λ)A, we have
x(t + 1) = Btx(1) + (1− λ)(I + B +B2 + · · ·+Bt−1)1.
It’s valuable to notice that the convergence of
x(t) might not be exactly the same as the conver-
gence of the Neumann series I+B+B2+ · · ·+
Bt−1. In fact, the latter might well be strictly
stronger, because here 1 is not an arbitrary vec-
tor but fixed.
The fact that 1 is an eigenvector of any
stochastic matrix makes our analysis quite easy.
In fact, since A is a stochastic matrix, it’s easy
to check that Bt1 = (2λ − 1)t1, and thus
x(t+ 1) = Btx(1) + 12(1− (2λ− 1)
t)1.
(i) When λ = 0, dynamic (5) does not con-
verge for x(1) = 1, and thus is divergent. In fact,
it can be observed in this case that x(t + 1) =
1−(−1)t+1
2 .(ii) When λ 6= 0 and −1 /∈ σ(A), we know
by definition of B that ρ(B) < 1. In fact, for
each r ∈ σ(B) (notice that r might be complex),
there exists a complex number xi + y ∈ σ(A),
x2 + y2 ≤ 1, such that
r = λ− (1− λ)(xi+ y).
Therefore
|r|2 = (λ− (1− λ)y)2 + ((1 − λ)x)2
= λ2 + (1− λ)2(x2 + y2)− 2λ(1− λ)y
≤ λ2 + (1− λ)2 + 2λ(1 − λ)
= 1,
and equality holds if and only if y = −1, i.e.
−1 ∈ σ(A).
Lemma 3 tells us that limt→∞Bt = 0, and
thus limt→∞Btx(1) = 0 for all x1. On the other
hand, |2λ − 1| < 1 implies that limt→∞(2λ −
1)t = 0. Therefore dynamic (5) converges to 121
regardless of x(1), and hence the theorem. ✷
Corollary 1. In the special case of the hetero-
geneous DeGroot model with all rebels, suppose
the learning topology A is stochastic and the as-
sociated digraph G(A) is strongly connected. If
λ 6= 0, G(A) is aperiodic, then dynamic (5) con-
verges to 121, regardless of x(1).
Proof. By Lemma 2 we know that A is prim-
itive, and therefore 1 is the only eigenvalue that
is on the spectral circle. Consequently, it is im-
possible for -1 to be an eigenvalue of A. By part
(i) of Theorem 1, this corollary is valid. ✷
We are going to show next that when λ 6= 0,
then G(A) must be very special to have (5) to be
divergent. And consequently in this case, (5) is
convergent for a very broad classes of learning
topologies. To demonstrate this result, we need
to define a special class of digraphs, which is a
slight generalization of bipartite graphs.
Definition 3. [Brualdi and Cvetkovic, 2009,
p176] Suppose G is a digraph with node sets
N . If N can be partitioned into h nonempty sets
N0, N1, · · · , Nh, such that each edge of G has its
initial node in some Nl and its terminal node in
Nl+1 (subscripts considered modulo h), then G
is called cyclically h-partite.
Corollary 2. In the special case of the hetero-
geneous DeGroot model with all rebels, suppose
the learning topology A is stochastic and the as-
sociated digraph G(A) is strongly connected. If
λ 6= 0, and dynamic (5) does not converge, then
G(A) is a cyclically h-partite graph for some
h ≥ 2.
Proof. By part (ii) of Theorem 1 we know
that A is imprimitive ({−1, 1} ⊆ σ(A)). Brualdi
and Cvetkovic (2009, p176) tell us that for each
strongly connected imprimitive stochastic ma-
trix, its associated digraph is h-partite. Hence
the corollary. ✷
Brualdi and Cvetkovic (2009, p176) tell us
more. In fact, the parameter h in Corollary 2 is
exactly the index of imprimitivity, i.e. the num-
ber of eigenvalues on the spectral circle.
We finish this subsection by noting that
whether a stochastic matrix has an eigenvalue
of -1, a property that is very crucial to the con-
vergence of (5) as shown by Theorem 1, can be
checked very efficiently. In fact, −1 ∈ σ(A) if
and only if the determinant of I +A is zero.
3.2 The general case with partial rebels
Recall that ∀j ∈ N , uj = 1 means that she is
a conformist, and uj = 0 a rebel. Let U =
diag(u1, u2, · · · , un), i.e. the n×nmatrix whose
diagonal entries are u1, u2, · · · , un and all the
other entries are zero. Then the updating rule
is
x(t+1) = λx(t)+(1−λ)(UAx(t)+(I−U)(1−Ax(t))). (6)
Theorem 2. In the heterogeneous DeGroot
model with partial rebels, suppose the learning
topology A is stochastic and the associated di-
graph G(A) is strongly connected.
(i) When λ = 0, if ρ((2U − I)A) 6= 1, then
dynamic (6) converges to 121.(ii) When λ 6= 0, if 1 /∈ σ((2U − I)A), then
dynamic (6) converges to 121.
Proof. Dynamic (6) can be rewritten as
x(t+1) = (λI +(1− λ)(2U − I)A)x(t) + (1− λ)(I −U)1.
Let B = λI + (1− λ)(2U − I)A, we have
x(t+ 1) = Btx(1) + (I + B + B2 + · · ·+ Bt−1)(I − U)1.
Since |(2U − I)A| ≤ A, i.e. the absolute
value of each entry of (2U−I)A is no more than
the corresponding value of A, we know from
Lemma 4 below that
ρ((2U − I)A) ≤ ρ(A) = 1. (7)
(i) When λ = 0, B = (2U − I)A. If ρ((2U −
I)A) 6= 1, then ρ(B) < 1, and thus by Lemma 3
we know that limt→∞Bt = 0, and the Neumann
series I + B + B2 + · · · + Bt−1 converges to
(I − B)−1 = (I − (2U − I)A)−1. Therefore,
(I +B +B2 + · · ·+Bt−1)(I −U)1 converges
to (I − (2U − I)A)−1(I − U)1.
Because
(I − (2U − I)A)1 = 1− (2U − I)1
= 2(I − U)1,
we get
(I − (2U − I)A)−1(I − U)1 =
1
2
1.
(ii) When λ 6= 0, using the same argument as
in the proof to part (ii) of Theorem 1, we know
that ρ(B) = 1 is equivalent to
1 ∈ σ((2U − I)A).
Hence the theorem. ✷
Definition 3. Suppose G is a digraph, and
each node belongs to one of the two types, con-
formists and rebels. We say G is a rebel-bipartite
graph if and only if there is no cycle with an odd
number of rebels.
To prove the next theorem, we need the fol-
lowing standard result from matrix theory.
Lemma 4. [Wielandt’s Theorem, Meyer,
2000, p675] If |B| ≤ An×n, where A is irre-
ducible, then ρ(B) ≤ ρ(A). If equality holds
(i.e., if µ = ρ(A)eiφ ∈ σ(B) for some φ), then
B = eiφD−1AD for some
D =


eiθ1
eiθ2
.
.
.
eiθ1

 ,
and conversely.
Theorem 3. In the heterogeneous DeGroot
model with partial rebels, suppose the learning
topology A is stochastic and the associated bi-
graph G(A) is strongly connected. When λ 6= 0,
if dynamic (6) does not converge, then G(A) is a
rebel-bipartite graph.
Proof. By Theorem 2, the hypothesis that dy-
namic (6) does not converge means that
ρ((2U − I)A) = 1.
By Lemma 4, there exits θ1, · · · , θn ∈ [0, 2pi)
such that
(2U − I)A = D−1AD, (8)
where D =


eiθ1
eiθ2
.
.
.
eiθn

 .
Equality (8) says that
Ajk = e
−iθjeiθkAjk, if j is a conformist, (9)
and
−Ajk = e
−iθjeiθkAjk, if j is a rebel. (10)
For each Ajk > 0, equations (9)(10) tell us
that
θj = θk, if j is a conformist, (11)
|θj − θk| = pi, if j is a rebel. (12)
With the above discussions in hand, we are
now ready to prove that G(A) is a rebel-bipartite
graph. Suppose on the contrary that there exists
a directed graph with an odd number of rebels.
Let j1, j2, · · · , j2k−1 be all the rebels on such a
cycle, and this is the order that they are allocated,
(i.e. j2 is the first rebel that we meet if we start
from j1 and walk along the cycle in the direction
that is consistent with the graph, and so on). By
(11)(12) we know that
|θj1 − θj2 | = pi, · · · , |θj2k−2 − θj2k−1 | = pi.
W.l.o.g., suppose θj1 − θj2 = pi, i.e. θj1 =
θj2+pi. Since θj1 ∈ [0, 2pi), this can only happen
when θj2 ∈ [0, pi). And therefore |θj2 − θj3 | = pi
can only happen when θj3 = θj2 + pi, because if
θj2 = θj3 + pi we would get θj3 < 0, which is
impossible by hypothesis. Hence
θj1 = θj3.
Repeating the above argument, we will get
θj1 = θj3 = · · · = θj2k−1 = θj2 = · · · = θj2k−2 ,
i.e. all the θ’s are identical, which is impossible.
Hence the theorem. ✷
3.3 Further discussions
All the discussions in the preceding subsections
assume that the learning topology is strongly
connected. If we dump this assumption, then
similar results still hold. In fact, as explored
by Golub and Jackson (2010), each closed and
strongly connected group of the whole society
evolves completely like a small strongly con-
nected society, because their opinions are not af-
fected by players outside of this group at all. It’s
interesting to investigate behaviors of the players
that are not in any closed and strongly connected
group.
As to convergence rate, we know from stan-
dard matrix theory that it is determined in the
special case with all rebels by the second largest
eigenvalue of λI − (1 − λ)A, which is λ −
(1 − λ)r, where r is the second smallest eigen-
value of A. It might be much more complicated
for the general case, because the eigenvalues of
λI+(1−λ)(2U−I)A might have no connection
with those of A at all.
4 Conclusions
We study a heterogeneous DeGroot model in this
paper. Analysis shows that the effect of rebels
is significant: under very weak conditions they
will always lead the society to doctrine of the
mean. This result is more or less surprising, be-
cause at first sight the rebels seem to be really
radical. Our result confirms further the media-
tion role of rebels, which is first discovered by
Galam (2004), i.e. they tend to make things more
equal. Further directions include giving suffi-
cient and necessary conditions for convergence
and analyzing the more realistic situation where
different players may have different confidence
levels. It’s also very interesting to investigate the
effect of the other kind of rebels who go to ex-
tremes. To be precise, if the overall opinion of
her neighbors is 0.3, then she will hold an opin-
ion of 1, and in the case that her neighbors hold
an opinion of 0.7, she will choose 0. They might
be rebels in the real sense.
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